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Abstract
In a typical experiment on decision making, one out of two possible stimuli is displayed and observers decide which one
was presented. Recently, Stanford and colleagues (2010) introduced a new variant of this classical one-stimulus presentation
paradigm to investigate the speed of decision making. They found evidence for ‘‘perceptual decision making in less than
30 ms’’. Here, we extended this one-stimulus compelled-response paradigm to a two-stimulus compelled-response
paradigm in which a vernier was followed immediately by a second vernier with opposite offset direction. The two verniers
and their offsets fuse. Only one vernier is perceived. When observers are asked to indicate the offset direction of the fused
vernier, the offset of the second vernier dominates perception. Even for long vernier durations, the second vernier
dominates decisions indicating that decision making can take substantial time. In accordance with previous studies, we
suggest that our results are best explained with a two-stage model of decision making where a leaky evidence integration
stage precedes a race-to-threshold process.
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Introduction
Humans can recognize objects and animals within a fraction of
a second suggesting that decisions can be made very quickly [1]. In
a typical decision making experiment, a stimulus is presented and
observers have to decide as fast and accurately as possible between
two response alternatives. The viewing time of the stimulus is
unlimited [2,3]. The speed of decision making is traditionally
quantified in terms of reaction times, i.e., the time from stimulus
onset to motor response onset. However, reaction times do not
only include the decision making time but also sensory and motor
delays, which makes it difficult to disentangle the three [4].
Decision making is often assumed for simplicity to be a one-stage
process where stimulus evidence is accumulated until the evidence
for one of the two response alternatives crosses a threshold [5–19]
(Fig. 1A).
Recently, Stanford and colleagues (2010) introduced a novel
compelled-response paradigm [20] (Fig. 1B). In this paradigm,
monkeys were first shown a red or green fixation dot. Next, two
yellow peripheral dots were displayed indicating the two potential
target locations (‘‘GO’’). Then, the fixation dot disappeared and
monkeys started a saccade to either target location. After a
variable duration (‘‘GAP’’), one of the yellow dots turned red, the
other green. Monkeys were required to saccade to the dot
matching the color of the fixation dot within 600 ms after the
disappearance of the fixation dot to receive reward (Fig. 1B).
Saccades longer than 600 ms were not rewarded even when
correct. Hence, viewing time of the stimulus was variable
depending on gap duration. For long gap durations, saccades
may be initiated even before the target is presented on the screen.
Hence, no or little stimulus evidence is accumulated leading to
chance performance because both alternatives are equally likely to
cross the threshold first. The shorter the gap durations are the
more stimulus evidence is available. Evidence for correct responses
increases and evidence for incorrect responses decreases (Fig. 1C).
Hence, the gap duration (GAP) determines the processing time
(PT ) available for decision making, i.e., PT~RT{GAP, RT for
reaction times (Fig. 1D). Stanford and colleagues plotted PT
versus the percentage of correct responses (tachometric function;
Fig. 1E; Stanford and colleagues (2010) plot the effective processing
time ePT~RT{Gap{TND, where TND is the non-decisional
time (sensory and motor delays) as estimated by the duration of the
flat part of the tachometric function [20]). The flat part of the
tachometric function at about 50% correct responses reflects the
constant sensory and motor delays. The rise time t from 50% to
75% correct responses is a measure for the accumulation of
evidence. Stanford et al. (2010) found t to be around 30 ms,
suggesting that decision making is a very rapid process. Here, we
extended the compelled-response paradigm to a two-stimulus
presentation paradigm. Our results show that decision making can
take substantial amounts of time.
Results
First, we adapted the compelled-response paradigm for human
observers and vernier stimuli. A fixation dot appeared which was
followed by two arrows (‘‘GO’’) indicating the two response
alternatives (left/right push button presses). After a gap of a
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variable duration, a vernier was presented. The vernier consisted
of two slightly offset vertical segments. The task of the observer
was to report the position of the lower segment with respect to that
of the upper segment as quickly as possible (Fig. 2A). As Stanford
and colleagues, we computed the processing time
PT~RT{GAP and determined percentage of correct responses
for any given PT (tachometric function). We found that the
tachometric function was flat for about 250–300 ms, followed by a
rapid transition. 75% correct responses (Fig. 2B) were reached at
t~63+17 ms (mean+SD) on average, a value well comparable
to Stanford and colleagues (2010).
To properly determine the processing time, it is important that
observers, indeed, start the response with the ‘‘GO’’ signal and do
not wait until the target appears [21]. If observers were holding the
response, PT would be independent of gap duration and hence
mis-calculated. The percentage of correct responses decreased
with increasing gap duration indicating that observers indeed
started the response with the ‘‘GO’’ signal (psychometric curve;
slope factor b~{0:1%=ms, significantly different from 0.0;
t(5) = 13.3160, p = 0.002; Fig. 2C). In addition, reaction times
increased only moderately with gap duration as determined by
linear regression (chronometric curve; slope factor b~0:28,
significantly different from 1.0; t(5) = 46.66, p = 0.004; Fig. 2D).
Hence, for a single vernier, our version of the compelled-response
paradigm leads to very similar results as found by Stanford et al.
[20].
In the second part of our study, we presented two verniers
immediately one after the other. The first vernier was offset either
to the left or right, whereas the second vernier was always offset in
the opposite direction (Fig. 3A). Hence, if the first vernier was
offset to the left, the second vernier was offset to the right and vice
versa. In the first condition, we presented the first vernier for
80 ms and the second vernier until the end of the response period.
If perceptual evidence were directly fed into a rapid decision
process as assumed by most race-to-threshold models, the
performance should be dominated by the first vernier, because
the evidence for the first vernier would quickly cross threshold. In
contrast to this prediction, we found that the second vernier
strongly dominates the responses for all three observers (Fig. 3B).
The dominance of the second vernier is largely unaffected by the
duration of the first vernier indicating cancelation before the race
to threshold process (Fig. 4A–C). In the second condition, both
verniers were presented with the same duration. Still, the second
vernier dominated except for the 20/20 ms condition where no
dominance of either vernier was found (Fig. 4D–F). These findings
suggest that decisions are based on an accumulation of evidence
that outlasts the 63 ms that we found in the first part of the study.
Therefore, the rise time of the tachometric function does not
Figure 1. Rapid decision making and compelled responses. A.
Race-to-threshold model. Evidence for each stimulus alternative is
accumulated until a threshold a is crossed (solid red and green lines for
either of the two stimulus alternatives, respectively). The evidence for
the stimulus alternative that crosses the threshold first determines the
decision (here, red). Reaction times vary because the accumulated
evidence varies across trials due to noise (dashed lines). B. Compelled
response paradigm [20]. A red or green central fixation dot is presented.
Then, two peripheral yellow dots appear. The response period starts
when the central fixation dot disappears (‘‘GO’’). After a variable ‘‘GAP’’
of 50–250 ms duration, one of the dots turns red and the other green.
In order to receive reward, macaque monkeys had to execute a saccade
to the dot which matched the color of the fixation dot within 600 ms
after the GO signal. The difference between the reaction time (RT) and
the gap duration (GAP) is the processing time (PT), i.e., the duration for
which stimulus evidence is available for decision making. C. Accelerated
race-to-threshold model according to Stanford et al. [20]. During the
GAP period, noise drives the decision process for both stimulus
alternatives. If gap durations are long, the noise drives evidence across
the threshold leading to a ‘‘guess’’ decision (not shown). If gap
durations are short, the evidence for the correct answer quickly
increases (red line) rapidly leading to a decision, while the evidence for
the other alternative decreases (green line). D. Total reaction times (RT)
in the compelled-response paradigm consist of the gap duration, the
constant sensory and motor delays and the actual decision making time
which is identical to the time of evidence integration. In classical
decision making experiments, no gap is presented. E. In the compelled-
response paradigm, the decision making time can be derived from the
tachometric function. The tachometric function plots performance
(percent correct) as a function of processing time PT~RT{GAP, i.e.,
the duration stimulus evidence is available for decision making. The
non-decisional time (sensory and motor delay) is thought to be
reflected in the flat part of the tachometric function where performance
is around 50%. The rise time t from chance level 50% performance to
the 75% correct responses threshold (dashed line) is a measure for
evidence accumulation. Stanford et al. (2010) estimated this time to be
about 30 ms [20].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0046525.g001
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reflect the full decision process, but at least partly ignores a silent
period of, as we will suggest, evidence integration.
Discussion
In the first part of the experiment, we showed that decision
making in vernier offset discrimination takes only a few tens of
milliseconds. This finding is well in line with the findings of
Stanford and colleagues who found evidence for ‘‘perceptual
decision making in less than 30 ms’’ in monkeys [1,21,22]. The
difference in duration between the two studies is most likely based
on differences in task difficulty and faster reaction times in
monkeys in general.
Stanford and colleagues (2010) fit their data with a one-stage
race-to-threshold model where the stimulus directly drives
evidence accumulation towards a threshold [3,6–20,23]. A
decision is made when evidence accumulation crosses the
threshold. Information that arrives after threshold crossing does
not change the decision. We tested this prediction in the second
part of the experiment by presenting two verniers with opposite
offset directions (Fig. 3A). If decision making takes less than 63 ms,
as estimated in the one vernier condition (Fig. 2B), the first vernier
should dominate performance when presented for durations
longer than 63 ms. Hence, performance in the condition, where
both verniers are presented for 80 ms, should be very similar to the
one vernier condition with 80 ms. The accumulated evidence for
the first vernier should have crossed the threshold before the
second vernier even entered the decision process. However, this
was clearly not the case (Fig. 3B). The second vernier dominates in
the two vernier condition and performance curves for the two
conditions are rather mirror symmetric.
How can these results be explained? In a recent study, we
investigated decision making with the one vernier fusion
paradigm, i.e., a no compelled response paradigm. We found
that accuracy and reactions times were not easily be explained
with classical one-stage models [24]. For this reason, we proposed
a two-stage model in which evidence integration and the race-to-
threshold are not one and the same process in accordance with
previous findings [25–27]. In our model, stimulus evidence is first
integrated in a buffer after sensory transmission (Fig. 3C). Because
of the buffering, evidence is not directly fed into the race-to-
threshold process. This period is invisible in one-stimulus
paradigms because subsumed in the flat part of the tachometric
curve (which is usually attributed to the non-decisional time of
Figure 2. Compelled response paradigm for vernier stimuli [20]. A. Vernier only condition. Each trial started with the presentation of a
fixation dot presented with a random duration of 800–1200 ms. After a blank period with a random duration of 200–400 ms, two arrows were
presented (‘‘GO’’) starting the response period of 600 ms. After a variable gap of 50–230 ms, a vernier was presented until the end of the response
period. Human observers indicated the offset direction as quickly as possible. Gap durations were presented randomly interleaved. B. Performance of
three observers in the vernier only condition. We determined the time from the ‘‘GO’’ signal to the response and subtracted the gap duration in each
trial (PT). Performance is at about chance level from 0 ms to about 250 ms. Then, performance quickly rises reaching 75% correct responses within
63 ms on average. The dot sizes reflect the number of responses per 10 ms bin. C. Performance as a function of gap duration. Had observers always
waited for the targets, the curve would be a constant (b~0:00%=ms; red dashed line). However, the longer the gap, the worse is performance (blue
dots; fitted linear regression, blue line: b~{0:1%=ms). Error bars represent the standard deviation of the mean (SD) for three observers. D. Reaction
times as a function of gap duration. Reaction times increase only moderately (b~0:51) indicating that observers react immediately to the go signal
(blue dots). The red curve (b~1:0) shows hypothetical RTs if observers had held the response until the cue appeared.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0046525.g002
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sensory and motor delays only). The output of the buffer is, then,
fed into a race-to-threshold process. The fast race-to-threshold
process is reflected in the rapid transition from chance level
performance to 75% correct responses [20]. Evidence integration
in the sensory buffer must exceed 80 ms because the second
vernier dominates even when the first vernier is presented for
80 ms. In our model, the buffer is implemented as a leaky
integrator leading to ‘‘forgetting’’ of the evidence for the first
vernier, thus, explaining the dominance of the second vernier.
Performance curves are very similar when the first vernier is
presented for various durations (Fig. 4A–E) suggesting that the
second vernier, presented until the end of the 600 ms response
period, fully ‘‘cancels’’ the first vernier during evidence integra-
tion, i.e., before the race-to-threshold process starts. This holds
also true when the two verniers have equal duration, except for the
20/20 ms condition, where none of the two verniers dominates
and performance remains at 50% dominance.
Our two stage model is well in accordance with previous work
showing that sensory processing, e.g., motion processing or
contrast detection, precede decision making [25–27]. This sensory
processing stage is very comparable to our evidence integration
stage for our high contrast vernier stimuli. A two-stage model
might also explain the difference between the present study and
the one by Stanford and colleagues (2010) which aimed to estimate
the timing of the motor decision process. If ‘‘sensory’’ evidence
integration precedes a motor decision process, then, our data
indicate that indeed the motor decision process may well be very
rapid. However, in addition to this fast motor decision process, a
slow evidence integration stage adds to the entire decision making
process.
These considerations rely on the assumption that decision
making in two- and one-stimulus presentation paradigms proceed
along the same lines. It might be that, because of the conflict
between the two verniers presented in one trial, more complex
mechanisms are in operation in two-stimulus presentation
paradigms than if only one stimulus is presented. For example, it
may be that there is strong inhibition between the vernier
detectors in the two-vernier presentation paradigm but none if
only one vernier is presented. However, whatever the mechanisms,
our vernier fusion paradigm shows evidence for a silent integration
process in decision making which is not visible in one-stimulus
presentation paradigms. We like to mention that feature fusion is
not restricted to verniers but occurs with all sorts of stimuli [28,29].
When long stimulus durations exceed the timing of evidence
integration, the difference between evidence integration and
thresholding disappears [3,4]. Therefore it is not surprising that
evidence integration and thresholding are not distinguishable for
longer stimulus durations [16,17,30,31].
In summary, we have shown that reaction times can be
substantially long in a vernier fusion paradigm. The compelled
response paradigm, using single stimulus presentations and
combined with a race to threshold model to estimate the non-
sensory time, underestimates the total decision time in the vernier
fusion paradigm. In accordance with previous work, we suggest
that decision making is a two-stage process where evidence
integration precedes a race-to-threshold process. In one-stimulus
presentation paradigms, this evidence integration cannot be disentan-
gled from sensory and motor delays because they are subsumed in
the flat part of the tachistosopic function and therefore their timing
cannot be determined. The timing of evidence integration can
only be determined with two-stimulus presentation paradigms, where
the two stimulus alternatives are presented in each single trial. We
found that the entire decision making process clearly exceeds 80 ms.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All participants signed informed written consent. The study was
approved by the Commission cantonale (VD) d’e´thique de la
recherche sur l’eˆtre humain (Lausanne, Switzerland) and con-
ducted according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Observers
Three human observers (1 female, aged 25–30 years) partici-
pated in the study. Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
Figure 3. Compelled two-vernier stimulus response paradigm.
A. The first vernier was presented for 80 ms followed by a second
vernier with the opposite offset direction than the first vernier. The
second vernier was presented until the end of the response period. B.
For three observers, data are shown as percent dominance, i.e., the
percentage of responses in accordance with the first vernier. Hence,
when the first vernier dominates performance, dominance is above
50%; if the second vernier dominates dominance is below 50%. Dashed
curves denote performance in the vernier only condition for the three
observers (same as in Fig. 2B). The solid lines show performance in the
two-vernier condition. The second vernier dominates strongly. C. A two
stage model in which evidence is integrated first in a slow visual buffer
and then fed into a fast race-to-threshold process. In one stimulus
paradigms, the evidence integration is ‘‘invisible’’ because it is
subsumed in the flat part of the tachometric function and, thus,
confused with sensory and motor delays.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0046525.g003
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visual acuity as measured by the Freiburg visual acuity test [32].
All observers were nave to the purpose of the study. Observers
were paid students from the EFPL.
Setup
Stimuli were presented on a Tektronix 608 X-Y display or a HP
1332A X-Y display. Both X-Y displays were equipped with a P11
phosphor and controlled by a PC via a fast 16-bit DA converter.
Stimuli were presented at 80 cd/m2, a 1 MHz dot rate, a 200 Hz
refresh rate, and a dot pitch of 200 mm. Viewing distance was 2 m.
The room was dimly illuminated by a background light (0.5 lx) to
prevent adaptation to scotopic vision. Stimulus contrast was close
to 1.0.
Figure 4. Results of compelled two-vernier stimulus response paradigm. The first vernier was presented either for 80 ms (A, D), 40 ms (B,E)
or 20 ms (C, F). The second vernier was presented either until the end (‘‘end’’) of the response period (A, B, C) or for the same duration as the first
vernier (D, E, F). Dashed curves are re-plotted from Fig. 2B and denote performance in the vernier only condition and are identical in all six plots. Solid
lines indicate performance in the two-vernier conditions. When the second vernier was presented until the end of the response period, the second
vernier clearly dominated performance (A–C; A is the same as Fig. 3B). Performance is very similar in all three conditions. When the second vernier
was presented for the same duration as the first one, dominance of the second vernier decreased when durations of both verniers decreased (D–F).
When the first and second vernier are presented for 20 ms each, dominance remains at about the 50% level for all subjects (F), i.e., both verniers
cancel each other out. The tachometric function is flat (all three lines are on top of each other and only the blue line is visible). Except for one
observer (green line), there is no evidence that evidence for the first vernier escapes integration with the second vernier. For this observer, it seems
that in the 80/80 ms and 40/40 ms, the first vernier dominates for short gap durations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0046525.g004
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Stimuli and Task
We tested two different stimulus conditions. The first condition
serves as a control and follows the compelled-response paradigm
that was recently introduced by Stanford et al. [20]. Each trial
started with a fixation dot (Fig. 2A). The disappearance of the
fixation dot indicated the beginning of a trial. Then, two arrows
appeared as a response prompt (‘‘GO’’). After a gap of a variable
duration of 50–250 ms duration, in which observers had to
prepare the response, a vernier was presented at the location of the
fixation dot for the remainder of the response period. The vernier
was composed of two slightly offset vertical segments (segments
were 109 (arc min) long, 0.59 wide, separated by a vertical gap of
19). The offset direction (left or right) was chosen randomly in each
trial. Observers were asked to report the position of the lower
segment with respect to that of the upper segment as quickly as
possible and within the response period of 600 ms by pressing one
out of two push buttons. Observers were instructed not to wait for
the stimulus, but to initiate a response as soon as the GO signal
was given. Observers received visual feedback if they did not
respond within the response period. The gap duration was varied
in 7 steps of 30 ms between 50 and 230 ms. All gap durations were
presented randomly interleaved. A total of 400 trials were
presented for each gap duration.
The second condition was identical to the control condition,
except that a sequence of two vernier stimuli with opposite offset
directions was presented in rapid succession, i.e. the interstimulus
interval is 0 ms, instead of the single vernier (Fig. 3A). The offset
direction of the first vernier was chosen randomly in each trial.
The second vernier had an offset direction opposite to that of the
first vernier. Observers perceived only one fused vernier with a
small offset and were not informed that a sequence of two vernier
stimuli was presented [33,34]. The first vernier was presented for
either 20, 40 or 80 ms and the second vernier for either the same
duration or until the end of the response period.
In the first and second condition, the horizontal offset of the
vernier(s) was 400, which was more than twice the size of the offset
discrimination threshold for each observer, as determined using
the adaptive PEST procedure [35]. Thresholds were determined
for a single vernier stimulus of 20 ms duration prior to the
experiment.
Reaction Time Analysis
Reaction times (RT) were measured from the ‘‘Go’’ Signal to
the response. Reaction times exceeding the response period of
600 ms were not included in the analysis (less than 3% of the
trials). In these trials observers are likely to have waited for the
stimulus before initiating the response.
Performance Measure
After subtraction of the gap durations from the reaction times,
responses were analyzed in time bins of 10 ms. For each bin, we
computed the dominance which is defined as the proportion of
responses that matched the offset direction of the first vernier.
Thus, values above 50% indicate dominance of the first vernier;
values below 50% indicate dominance of the second vernier. 50%
vernier dominance is the points of subjective equality, i.e., on
average the first and second vernier stimuli equally contribute to
performance. In the control condition, this measure is equivalent
to the percentage of correct responses. We plot processing time
(PT~RT{Gap) versus dominance.
Fitting
The tachometric function was fit with one out of three
parametric functions. The simplest function is given by the
constant chance level f0(x)~0:5. We fit the deviation of
performance from chance level with either a single or a linear
combination of two hyperbolic tangents:
f1(x)~
1
2
z
a
4
(1z tanh (b(x{c))) ð1Þ
f2(x)~
1
2
z
a1
4
(1z tanh (b1(x{c1)))
z
a2
4
(1z tanh (b2(x{c2)))
ð2Þ
Which of the three functions is used for the fit was determined
in a 10-fold cross-validation scheme: The parameters a,b and c
were fit to minimize the mean square error (MSE) on a training set
consisting of 90% of the data. We then evaluated a test set
consisting of the remaining 10%. This is repeated 10 times until all
data have served as test data once. The test MSE is given by the
sum of the MSEs on the 10 test sets. If a fit with two hyperbolic
tangents improved the test MSE by more than 5%, we accepted
the increase from 3 to 6 parameters. If the fit by a single hyperbolic
tangent was not significantly better than the straight line, we
plotted f0(x). Once the function class is chosen, its parameters are
fit using the full data set. The rise time t from chance level to 75%
correct responses is defined by 25% divided by ab=4, the slope of
hyperbolic tangent at its inflection point.
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